湖北省武汉市人民政府


市人民政府关于印发市国资办拟订的《武汉市产权交易管理暂行规定》的通知
武汉市人民政府


通知
各区县人民政府，市人民政府各部门、各直属机构：
市人民政府同意市国资办拟订的《武汉市产权交易管理暂行规定》，现印发给你们，请遵照执行。

武汉市产权交易管理暂行规定


第一条 为了适应社会主义市场经济发展需要，推动产权制度的改革，规范产权交易行为，优化资源配置，制定本办法。
第二条 本办法所称产权交易，是指企业出资人财产所有权及相关财产权利通过市场有偿转让的交易行为。
第三条 产权交易的主体为：依法拥有产权的出让方和有偿取得产权的受让方。
第四条 产权交易应遵守有关法律、法规、规章、政策和下列原则：
（一）自愿、平等、公平、诚实、信用；
（二）符合国家和本市产业调整的需要；
（三）有利于优化资源配置，提高企业资产运营效益；
（四）有利于发挥国有经济在国民经济中的主导作用；
（五）向外商转让企业国有产权，符合有关产业政策规定。
第五条 武汉产权交易所是依法设立的非盈利性事业法人，是产权公开规范交易的场所。境内外的产权均可在该所交易。市属企业国有产权、集体产权的交易，应通过该所进行。
第六条 武汉产权交易市场管理委员会（以下简称管委会），在市人民政府统一领导下对产权交易进行宏观管理和监督、指导、协调。
第七条 市国有资产管理委员会办公室（以下简称国资办）是产权交易行政主管部门，应切实做好下列工作：
（一）组织贯彻落实有关法律、法规、规定、政策和管委会的决策；
（二）拟订产权交易市场发展规划及其相应政策；
（三）制定产权交易管理制度并组织实施；
（四）指导、监督和管理产权交易业务；
（五）审批产权交易方式，对上市交易产权的规模、种类进行控制；
（六）审批国有资产产权交易；
（七）调解重大复杂的产权交易纠纷；
（八）查处产权交易违规行为；
（九）审批产权交易经纪机构资格；
（十）市人民政府和管委会要求做好的其他工作。
第八条 武汉市产权交易所应认真履行下列职责：
（一）执行有关产权交易法律、法规、规章和政策；
（二）审查产权交易主体资格和交易条件；
（三）依法组织产权交易，维护交易双方合法权益；
（四）出具产权交易凭证，提供产权交易服务；
（五）发布和传递产权交易信息；
（六）调解产权交易纠纷；
（七）制定自律性管理制度（含具体业务规范）并报市国资办备案，接受市国资办的监督，定期向市国资办报告工作；
（八）其他应履行的职责。
第九条 武汉产权交易所实行会员制和理事会领导下的总经理负责制。理事会成员由市国资办、武汉产权交易所、市人民政府有关部门、有关投资单位和会员代表等组成。总经理由理事会聘任。
第十条 产权交易经纪机构，是指依法设立的接受客户委托进行代理或自营买卖产权的机构。
产权交易经纪机构应是武汉产权交易所会员，并符合下列条件：
（一）是企业法人或者其他组织；
（二）有100万元以上的注册资金，从事自营买卖产权业务的，须有500万元以上的注册资金；
（三）有从事产权交易的专业人员；
（四）遵守武汉产权交易所的章程和自律性规定；
（五）有自己的章程。
第十一条 产权出让方可以是境内外拥有产权的法人、自然人或者其他组织。产权受让方可以是境内外有民事权利能力和民事行为能力，能独立承担民事责任的法人、自然人或者其他组织。
第十二条 下列产权为产权交易客体：
（一）非公司制企业整体或部分产权（含有形资产产权、无形资产产权和财产使用权等）；
（二）有限责任公司和非上市股份公司的股权；
（三）经依法批准的其他产权。
第十三条 产权交易应采取下列方式：
（一）协议转让；
（二）竞价拍卖；
（三）招标转让；
（四）市国资办批准的其他方式。
第十四条 产权有下列情况之一的，不得进行交易；确需交易的，应按规定程序报有关部门批准。
（一）涉及国家机密的；
（二）涉及专营行业的；
（三）所有权有争议的；
（四）处置权受限制或有争议的；
（五）已实施司法、行政、仲裁强制措施的；
（六）在合法契约约定不得交易期限内的；
（七）其他不宜进行产权交易的。
第十五条 法人、自然人或在其他组织有下列情况之一的，不得出让或者受让产权：
（一）未取得法人资格，或者法人资格已消亡的机构或者组织；
（二）无民事行为能力和限制民事行为能力的自然人；
（三）违法行为被司法机关立案调查，尚未结案的法人和自然人；
（四）未经武汉产权交易所确认合法的产权交易经纪人；
（五）其他法律、法规、规定和政策规定不得进行产权交易活动的法人和自然人。
第十六条 产权交易应按申请登记、挂牌上市、查询洽谈、成交签约、结算交割、变更登记的程序进行。
第十七条 通过武汉产权交易所进行产权交易的，应向该所提出申请。
产权出让方提出申请，应提交出让产权申请书、资格证明、产权归属证明、批准出让产权的证明、产权出让单位情况证明和其他必要资料。
产权受让方提出申请，应提交购买产权申请书、资格证明、资信能力和其他必要资料。
产权交易涉及企业职工安置的，应由交易双方按有关规定达成协议，妥善安置。协议文本应经有关部门审核，并交武汉产权交易所备案。
第十八条 武汉产权交易所对产权交易申请审查同意后，授意产权出让方或者受让方填写登记表，并按双方意愿进行撮合或者挂牌公布。
第十九条 产权交易应先由国资办组织进行产权界定，再委托有资格的评估机构评估产权价值。产权界定和产权价值评估也可在产权交易双方达成意向协议后进行。
产权评估价为出让产权的底价。国有资产和集体资产的产权评估价值应经国资办确认。
产权交易成交价可在产权评估价的基础上有一定幅度的浮动，但产权交易成交价低于产权评估价90％，是国有资产的，应报经国资办同意；是集体资产的，应经出资人重新确认。
第二十条 产权交易成交价和其他产权交易条件确定后，应在武汉产权交易所主持下，由产权交易双方按有关规定签订产权转让合同。产权转让合同经双方法定代表人签字、盖章，武汉产权交易所鉴证后生效。
第二十一条 市国资办和市税务、财政、外资、房地、劳动、社保、公安、工商等部门以及银行应凭武汉产权交易所出具的产权转让凭证和产权转让合同，给产权交易双方办理有关手续。
第二十二条 武汉产权交易所和产权交易经纪机构业务收费项目和标准，由市国资办商市财政、物价部门确定。
第二十三条 行政事业性资产产权交易，参照本办法执行。
第二十四条 本办法的具体应用问题，由市国资办负责解释。
第二十五条 本办法自发布之日起施行。



1997年7月4日
Chapter Ⅲ
Initiation of Panel Procedures


OUTLINE

Section One Role of Consultations: Art. 4
I The Importance of Consultations
II Issues Concerning the “adequacy” of Consultations
Section Two Establishment of Panels: Art. 6.2
I Introduction
II Indication of Consultations Process
III Identification of “the specific measures at issue”
IV Provision of “a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint”
V Concluding Remarks
Section Three Terms of Reference of Panels: Art. 7
I Introduction
II Effect of Consultations on Terms of Reference of Panels
III The “matter referred to the DSB”
Section Four The Mandate of Compliance Panels: Art. 21.5
I Introduction
II Clarification of “measures taken to comply”
III Perspective of Review under Art.21.5
IV Examination of the New Measure in Its Totality and in Its Application
Section Five Third Party Rights : Art. 10
I Introduction
II Generic Third Party Rights: Interpretation of Art. 10.3
III Extended Third Party Rights: Exercise of Panels’ Discretion
IV Summary and Conclusions





Section One
Role of Consultations: Art. 4

The procedures for consultations under the WTO, significantly different from the procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation as prescribed in Art. 5 of the DSU which remains voluntary options if the parties to the dispute so agree, remains a mandatory first step in the dispute settlement process as embodied with text of Art. 4 of the DSU. However, as to be shown below, there is something to be clarified so as to understand appropriately the role of consultations under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

I The Importance of Consultations
The practice of GATT contracting parties in regularly holding consultations is testimony to the important role of consultations in dispute settlement. Art. 4.1 of the DSU recognizes this practice and further provides that: “Members affirm their resolve to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation procedures employed by Members.” A number of reports made by panels or by the Appellate Body under the WTO have recognized the value of consultations within the dispute settlement process.
As noted by a panel, Members’ duty to consult concerns a matter with utmost seriousness: “Compliance with the fundamental obligation of WTO Members to enter into consultations where a request is made under the DSU is vital to the operation of the dispute settlement system. Article 4.2 of the DSU provides that ‘[e]ach Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former’. Moreover, pursuant to Article 4.6 of the DSU, consultations are ‘without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further proceedings’. In our view, these provisions make clear that Members' duty to consult is absolute, and is not susceptible to the prior imposition of any terms and conditions by a Member.” 1
Another panel addresses the essence of consultations, and they rule there that: “Indeed, in our view, the very essence of consultations is to enable the parties gather correct and relevant information, for purposes of assisting them in arriving at a mutually agreed solution, or failing which, to assist them in presenting accurate information to the panel.”2
The Appellate Body confirms panels’ rulings in this respect. For example, the Appellate Body stresses those benefits afforded by consultations to the dispute settlement system in Mexico-HFCS（DS132）（21.5）as: “[…] Through consultations, parties exchange information, assess the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases, narrow the scope of the differences between them and, in many cases, reach a mutually agreed solution in accordance with the explicit preference expressed in Article 3.7 of the DSU. Moreover, even where no such agreed solution is reached, consultations provide the parties an opportunity to define and delimit the scope of the dispute between them. Clearly, consultations afford many benefits to complaining and responding parties, as well as to third parties and to the dispute settlement system as a whole.”3

II Issues Concerning the “adequacy” of Consultations
As noted above, the procedures for consultations remain a mandatory first step in the dispute settlement process under the WTO. However, does it mean that there is a requirement for the adequacy of consultations before initiating a panel proceeding?
With regard to this issue, on the one hand, the Panel on Alcoholic Beverages (DS75/DS84) finds that, “the WTO jurisprudence so far has not recognized any concept of ‘adequacy’ of consultations”, the Panel Report reads in pertinent part:4
“In our view, the WTO jurisprudence so far has not recognized any concept of ‘adequacy’ of consultations. The only requirement under the DSU is that consultations were in fact held, or were at least requested, and that a period of sixty days has elapsed from the time consultations were requested to the time a request for a panel was made. What takes place in those consultations is not the concern of a panel. The point was put clearly by the Panel in Bananas III, where it was stated:
‘Consultations are […] a matter reserved for the parties. The DSB is not involved; no panel is involved; and the consultations are held in the absence of the Secretariat. While a mutually agreed solution is to be preferred, in some cases it is not possible for parties to agree upon one. In those cases, it is our view that the function of a panel is only to ascertain that the consultations, if required, were in fact held. […]’